Security

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Pushes Card Skimmer and iOS Exploits to 178 Brands

Attackers hid a multi purpose payload inside Optimizely project settings, letting a trusted CDN deliver wallet swappers and card skimmers to banks, broadcasters and retailers for about 19 hours.

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By TechQuire Daily Staff TechQuire Daily Staff
November 17, 2026 / 7 min read

Visitors to some of the world's most heavily trafficked websites load code they never see, pulled from domains they never chose. Analytics, tag managers and experimentation platforms arrive as third-party JavaScript, and each runs with the full authority of the page that included it. The arrangement works because of a simple assumption: if the script comes from a well known content delivery network over HTTPS, it must be safe.

Optimizely Web is one of the platforms that depends on that assumption. Customers install a snippet such as https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js, and the file bundles Optimizely's own runtime, the customer's experiments and an optional Project JavaScript field that executes on every page view. Served from cdn.optimizely.com, the file carries Optimizely's certificate and arrives from a host every affected site already trusts.

That Project JavaScript field is the structural weak point. It holds customer supplied code inside a vendor console, and that code is then concatenated into a file delivered from the vendor's CDN. Browsers cannot distinguish Optimizely's logic from anything else in the same response, and Subresource Integrity checks are rarely applied to marketing snippets that change frequently. Whoever controls the field controls what every visitor executes.

On 16 November 2026, someone controlled it. An attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript of Optimizely Web customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched, so the same trusted URL kept serving the same trusted file, now with an extra payload attached. Scott Helme of Report URI documented the intrusion and published his findings the same day, and independent analysis from StepSecurity followed on 17 November under the campaign name OPTIMJACK.

Key Facts

Report URI reported on November 16 that malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through Optimizely Web, a list that includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Helme's team fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, found 188 infected ones belonging to those 178 organisations, and warned the real count is probably higher because the sweep could only examine snippets it found in time. Optimizely's own properties were caught too: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.

The last clean urlscan capture of the BBC snippet was at 02:21 UTC, and the first Optimizely injection appeared at 04:21 UTC in that same BBC snippet, loading a domain called webshell.lol. Certificates for 1688360.cc were issued between 04:28 and 05:23 UTC, the first build of track.js appeared at 08:10, the file was first seen on bbc.com at 08:28, and Zoom's snippet was modified at 11:20. Helme's sweep found 186 of 1,611 snippets infected between 19:24 and 19:59, mass clean-up ran from about 20:40 to 21:10, and one snippet was still infected at 21:52, roughly 19 hours after the first injection.

Three loader variants complicated detection. Most snippets carried a plain script tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js, some hid the same URL in base64 and decoded it with atob() so that searching for 1688360 found nothing, and at least one held a full inline copy that ran through eval if the domain was blocked. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with the base64 variant, which indicated the attacker still had access at that moment.

StepSecurity reported on November 17 that the payload was a single JavaScript file of about 30 KB with three independent blocks and an iOS branch. The crypto swapper held replacement addresses for ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE. A card skimmer was added to track.js at 13:43 UTC and targeted card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes typed into a site's own payment forms, though fields run by a separate payment provider stayed out of reach. The iOS branch injected an iframe into every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, delivering the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits and reloading affected pages every 60 seconds.

StepSecurity's sector breakdown puts banking and finance first with 32 organisations, followed by technology and SaaS with 23, retail and fashion with 20, streaming and entertainment with 12, news and media with 10, airlines and travel with 9, healthcare and pharma with 8, industrial and manufacturing with 8, telecoms with 7, crypto and trading with 6, and insurance with 6. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day as the operator added features and wallet addresses. The attacker's wallets received about $7,150 in crypto before being emptied early on 17 November, up from roughly $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, with a sweep of the LTC, ETH and BTC addresses between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC.

Analysis

What this really means is that the supply chain problem has moved past build systems and package registries into the marketing console. Nobody downloaded a malicious library, and nobody pushed a poisoned commit. The attacker used the product as designed: a field meant to let customers run their own experiments ran the attacker's experiment instead. Every control that looks at domain reputation, TLS certificates or allowlists saw exactly what it expected, because the CDN served exactly what it was given.

The bigger picture here is that visibility, not prevention, is now the binding constraint. Only 24 of the 178 organisations, about 15 percent, had a Content Security Policy strict enough to block the injected loader, according to the figures published alongside the investigation. StepSecurity cross-checked urlscan.io and found 76 scans across 30 domains that recorded a request to 1688360[.]cc between 08:28 and 21:23 UTC, with the payload itself stored for 17 domains, including CNN, BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Hootsuite, Smartsheet, Air France, KLM and Mutual of Omaha.

The intrusion looks less like an isolated prank than the latest run of a campaign. Report URI traced webshell.lol to Turkish sites on 17 September, and an earlier wave between 13 and 16 November injected webshell.lol/get.js through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au and foxsports.com. A cash-out address used in this operation also appeared in campaigns in March and on 3 November, which points to a crew reusing infrastructure, not an opportunist.

Some claims remain unresolved. Helme said of the card data, "We have no way to see how many credit cards were skimmed", and Hudson Rock, which investigated separately, has not been able to link the wallet transfers to visitors of the affected sites. The $7,150 haul is almost certainly a fraction of the true loss, because the damage that matters is measured in stolen card numbers and compromised sessions, not in the balance of a temporary wallet.

Why It Matters

For the 32 financial firms on the list, the incident lands directly on payment security obligations. A skimmer that reads card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes from a site's own checkout form can turn a trusted brand into a collection point, and the fact that the code arrived through a vendor's CDN does not change how the breach will be described to customers, auditors or regulators.

The trust model itself is what broke. Optimizely said in a status update that an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and a spokesperson told Gizmodo the flaw was in the account signup flow. StepSecurity reported on November 17 that Optimizely fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected user accounts, blocked code delivery in Cloudflare and notified affected customers. Help Net Security reported on November 17 that Salesforce told Reuters it was investigating unauthorised Optimizely changes and disabling scripts as a precaution. None of that repairs the structural gap: a console field that executes on every page is a production deployment surface, and it deserves the same review as one.

The practical lesson is that detection has to reach the field, not the file. StepSecurity's guidance is to block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the .icu hosts, to search logs back to 04:00 UTC on 16 November, and to read the Project JavaScript field of every Optimizely project, because scanning the served snippet for 1688360 misses the base64 loader entirely. The registry put 1688360.cc on hold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November and it no longer resolves, but the infrastructure behind it had already been rebuilt 26 times in a single day.

Next Up

Optimizely has notified affected customers and says the injected code has been removed, and Helme confirmed that all infected files were clean by late Monday. The open questions are the ones the public record cannot answer: how many payment cards were captured, how many iOS devices loaded the exploit kits, and whether any of the 178 organisations will be able to reconstruct that from their own telemetry.

Expect the next phase to focus on the account signup flow that Optimizely identified as the entry point, on the other experimentation and personalisation platforms that expose a similar customer supplied JavaScript field, and on whether Content Security Policy adoption finally moves from 15 percent toward something that would have mattered on 16 November.

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