Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria sign Caspian green power corridor at COP31

Energy ministers from Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria signed an intergovernmental Agreement on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Clean Energy in Antalya on 10 November 2026, establishing a cross-border corridor meant to carry Caspian renewable electricity through the South Caucasus and Türkiye into European markets. The ceremony took place during COP31, the climate summit Türkiye is hosting, and it committed the four governments to a shared framework for the transmission, distribution and trade of power generated from clean energy sources.

Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar called the project the TANAP of electricity, a reference to the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline that already carries Azerbaijani gas across Türkiye toward Europe. Where TANAP turned Azerbaijan into a gas supplier to the continent, the new corridor is meant to do the same for electrons along an Azerbaijan to Georgia to Türkiye to Bulgaria route that ends in European demand centres. Unlike a pipeline, the corridor is not a single piece of steel. It is a set of technical, commercial and regulatory arrangements layered on top of transmission systems that already exist.

The agreement did not appear overnight. Türkiye Today reported on November 10 that the initiative dates back to 22 November 2024, when the four countries agreed at the Istanbul Energy Forum to pursue new electricity connections. They formalised cooperation on 4 April 2025 by signing a memorandum of understanding on green electricity transmission and trade in Baku. At a ministerial meeting in Istanbul on 22 May 2026 the four sides agreed to prepare a roadmap and discussed establishing a joint venture to advance the corridor, and the COP31 signing converts that preparation into a formal intergovernmental instrument.

The political backdrop is Europe's accelerating electrification and its search for diversified supply. COP31's presidency has pushed for a global goal of raising electricity to 35 percent of final energy consumption by 2035 from roughly 20 to 23 percent today. Türkiye, which presents itself as a bridge for clean power, used the same summit to announce domestic targets that dwarf the corridor itself: around $300 billion in energy transition investment and 281 gigawatts of installed capacity by 2040, including 175 gigawatts of wind and solar.

Key Facts

The signatories were Bayraktar, Azerbaijan's Minister of Energy Parviz Shahbazov, Bulgaria's Minister of Energy Iva Petrova, and Georgia's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Mariam Kvrivishvili. The Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources announced on November 10 that the agreement aims to advance cross-border transmission, distribution and trade of electricity from clean sources, and to establish the technical, commercial and regulatory conditions for safe, reliable and uninterrupted electricity transmission between the countries.

The text also covers grid integration and a data layer. The ministry said the project envisages communications and data transmission over fibre-optic cables to support energy services, a detail that matters because cross-border trading depends on scheduling, metering and market data moving as reliably as the electrons. Bayraktar said the deal builds on foundations laid in 2024 and the memorandum signed in Baku in April 2025, and argued that it will strengthen energy ties among the countries, create new opportunities for clean energy trade and contribute to Europe's security of supply.

Capacity is where the numbers diverge. Türkiye Today reported on November 10 that the corridor is expected to have an initial transmission capacity of 1 gigawatt, a figure Shahbazov outlined in September 2026. Balkan Green Energy News reported on November 11 that Georgian media put planned transmission capacity at 2 GW to 3 GW, and that transmission system operators from the four countries would launch a joint company for the project. Neither the corridor's capacity nor its investment volume appeared in the Turkish ministry's announcement.

Anadolu Agency reported on November 11 that no binding capacity, cost estimate or construction schedule was disclosed in the intergovernmental text, which instead sets out the technical, commercial and regulatory groundwork and leaves project delivery to grid operators and a possible joint venture.

The corridor is not the only route being contemplated. Balkan Green Energy News reported on November 11 that the project rivals the proposed Green Energy Corridor, known as GECO, which would also run from Azerbaijan through Georgia but then continue under the Black Sea to Romania and Hungary. On the same day as the four-party signing, Anadolu Agency reported that Türkiye and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding at COP31 to advance the second phase of a joint renewable energy project, with ACWA Power tasked with building solar plants in Sivas and Karaman with 2 GW of combined capacity and another 3 GW in phase two, alongside wind, high-voltage direct current transmission and battery storage.

Analysis

What this really means is that the TANAP of electricity is currently a governance framework wearing an infrastructure headline. The agreement's value lies in the unglamorous machinery it creates: common technical standards, commercial rules for cross-border trade, regulatory conditions for uninterrupted supply, and a fibre-optic data link to make all of it operable. Those layers decide whether existing wires can be used commercially.

The capacity figures illustrate the ambiguity. A 1 gigawatt initial target, as Shahbazov described in September 2026, is roughly the scale of one large transmission link, not a continental supply route. The 2 GW to 3 GW figure reported by Georgian media is a plan rather than a commitment, and the intergovernmental text binds none of it. For scale, Türkiye alone intends to add 175 gigawatts of wind and solar by 2040. The corridor is therefore being designed to carry a fraction of the renewable build-out its own host country is planning, which suggests its near-term function is political and institutional rather than volumetric.

There is also a route contest. GECO would bypass Türkiye by going under the Black Sea to Romania and Hungary, while the four-party corridor keeps Türkiye as the indispensable transit state. Ankara's enthusiasm is easy to read in that light: the agreement locks in a role that a subsea cable could erode. For Azerbaijan, the appeal is optionality, since a hub able to sell into Türkiye, Bulgaria and the wider European market is worth more than one dependent on a single downstream buyer.

The bigger picture here is that Europe's clean power map is being drawn by transit politics as much as by generation economics. Bulgaria's participation gives the corridor an EU border and a foothold in the bloc's internal market, while Georgia and Azerbaijan supply geography and, eventually, volume. Whether that becomes traded megawatt hours depends on how fast regulators turn the text into market rules and how fast operators agree on capacity allocation. The absence of a cost estimate is itself a signal that financing has not been structured, and investors rarely move ahead of a number.

Why It Matters

For Europe, the corridor is a modest but symbolically useful addition to a supply security agenda that has shifted from molecules to electrons. The COP31 presidency's target of 35 percent electricity in final energy consumption by 2035 implies a grids and interconnection build-out on a scale no single country can finance or permit alone. A four-country framework that harmonises rules across the South Caucasus and up to the EU's eastern edge is a template, even if the first phase is small.

For Türkiye, the agreement supports a larger domestic narrative. The $300 billion transition investment plan and the 281 gigawatt capacity target for 2040, including 175 gigawatts of wind and solar, are pitched to investors as evidence that the country is both a market and a bridge. The corridor adds a regional dimension: Turkish grid capacity becomes an export asset rather than only a domestic cost centre.

For Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria, the stakes are different but complementary. Azerbaijan gains a route to European buyers for renewables beyond oil and gas, Georgia gains transit relevance, and Bulgaria gains an additional source of clean power at a moment when interconnection capacity is a strategic resource in its own right. None of those gains is guaranteed by a signature, which is why implementation matters more than the ceremony.

Next Up

The immediate test is procedural. The four countries have to convert the agreement into a roadmap, stand up the joint company that grid operators are expected to form, and settle the capacity figure the intergovernmental text left open. Türkiye Today reported on November 10 that the countries plan to use existing electricity infrastructure and gradually expand connections and capacity rather than build an entirely new network at the outset.

Beyond that, three things are worth watching: whether a binding capacity and cost estimate emerge, whether GECO advances in parallel and forces a de facto division of Caspian supply between the Turkish and Black Sea routes, and whether the Türkiye and Saudi Arabia phase two project, with 2 GW in Sivas and Karaman and a further 3 GW planned, adds enough generation to make the corridor's economics real. The COP31 signing is the start of the paperwork, not the end of it.